[507c]
Callicles, that the temperate man, as shown in our exposition, being just and brave and pious, is the perfection of a good man; and that the good man does well and fairly whatever he does and that he who does well is blessed and happy,1 while the wicked man or evil-doer is wretched. And this must be the man who is in an opposite case to the temperate,—the licentious man whom you were commending.So there is my account of the matter, and I say that this is the truth; and that, if this is true, anyone, as it seems,
1 As the various meanings of σωφροσυν́νη have been brought out to suggest that one side of virtues involves the others, so here the apparent quibble of εὖ πράττειν (“act well” and “fare well”) is intended to suggest a real dependence of happiness upon virtue.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3 translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967.
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